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Many tax reform proposals call for replac-
ing the individual and corporate income taxes
with a consumption tax. Supporters contend
that such a reform would increase national sav-
ing, boosting future income and consumption.
They also argue that consumption taxation is
fairer and simpler than income taxation. An
extensive literature discusses the wide-ranging
transitional effects of such a reform, particularly
the potential devaluation of the capital stock in
existence on the reform date. In this article, I
review and synthesize this literature.
The effects on the capital stock’s real value
arise from the differences in how the income
and consumption taxes treat investment. A styl-
ized income tax applies to gross output minus
depreciation, while a stylized consumption tax
applies to gross output minus gross investment.
In other words, the income tax allows a deduc-
tion only as the investment depreciates, while
the consumption tax allows new investment to
be deducted immediately. As explained below,
the consumption tax eliminates the net tax bur-
den on (marginal) investments because the 
savings from the initial deduction offset the
taxes on the subsequent output. Since the
switch to a consumption tax removes the tax
penalty on new investment, it is likely to
expand the capital stock.
However, the timing of the consumption
tax—an initial deduction offset by subsequent
taxes—has unfavorable implications for the
existing capital stock on the date of the reform.
This capital is subject to the future taxes but
does not receive the tax deduction granted to
new investment because the deduction was un-
available when the capital was produced. This
capital also loses the depreciation deductions
the income tax system provides. The introduction
of the consumption tax therefore tends to re-
duce the real value of the existing capital stock.
Assuming the income and consumption
taxes have stylized forms and capital is pro-
duced without adjustment costs, the real value
of the initial capital stock is reduced uniformly
by a proportion equal to the consumption tax
rate. In this simplified analysis, a 25 percent
consumption tax reduces the real value of all
capital by 25 percent. However, the tax reform
is likely to increase after-tax rates of return,
which benefits the owners of existing wealth.
The decline in value can be mitigated by transi-
tion relief (such as maintaining depreciation
deductions), at the cost of a higher tax rate on
current and future workers.
I show that under more realistic assump-
tions, the decline in the real value of the initial
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capital stock is likely to be smaller in aggregate,
but less uniform, than the simplified analysis
suggests. Consumer-owned capital and govern-
ment-owned capital escape the decline in value
because they receive special treatment under con-
sumption tax proposals. Also, tax reform forgives
the deferred income tax liabilities that many
types of capital currently face, which mitigates
or potentially reverses the decline in their real
value. Furthermore, tax reform is likely to in-
crease investment in most types of capital,
which in the presence of adjustment costs 
drives up the price of new capital and mitigates
the decline in the value of existing capital. How-
ever, tax reform is likely to reduce investment in
types of capital that are fully or partly exempt
from federal income tax, driving down their value.
The combined effect of these factors is
that some types of capital experience little or no
decline in value or even rise in value, while
other types experience significant declines. In
many cases, the magnitudes are uncertain.
I begin by comparing income and con-
sumption taxes, with particular attention to their
treatment of investment. I explain how the tim-
ing of the consumption tax tends to cause a
decline in the real value of the initial capital
stock and present the simplified analysis, con-
cluding that the proportional decline equals 
the tax rate. I then describe the implications 
of special treatment for consumer and govern-
ment capital, deferred income tax liabilities, 
and adjustment costs and summarize the overall
impact.
COMPARISON OF INCOME AND 
CONSUMPTION TAXES
I use a simple economic model to com-
pare income and consumption taxes. I assume
that there is no risk or uncertainty and that 
the economy is closed to international trade 
and investment. Gross output is produced 
from labor and capital in accordance with a
production function that may vary over time,
F(Kt,Lt,t). Since output and income are identical
in this closed economy, I use the terms inter-
changeably.
Output can be used as the economy’s 
single consumption good or as capital. At each
date  t, gross output is divided between con-
sumption and gross investment (production of
new capital),
(1) F(Kt,Lt,t) = Yt = Ct + It.
Since saving is equal to investment in this
closed economy, I use the terms interchange-
ably. Capital is the result of any current pro-
duction that allows an increase in future output
and includes intangible investments, such as
research and development.
In my initial simplified analysis, I assume
that capital can be produced at a constant mar-
ginal cost (in terms of consumption goods) and
that there are no adjustment costs associated
with investment. An unlimited number of units
of new capital can be produced, with each cost-
ing one unit of consumption. Conversely, any
unit of existing capital can be converted back
into one unit of consumption. Because capital
does not become more expensive as more is
produced, the supply of capital goods is infi-
nitely elastic. I also assume that new capital is
economically identical to, and therefore a per-
fect substitute for, existing capital. I modify
these assumptions below.
I assume that capital depreciates at an
annual geometric rate δ . One unit of current
investment increases the capital stock n years
later by exp(–δ n) units. The equation of motion
for the capital stock is
(2) K ·
t = It – δ Kt,
where the dot denotes rate of change.
The annual after-tax real rate of return
demanded by the savers who supply funds to
the firm is r. To simplify notation, I assume 
that  r  is constant over time. The wage rate
demanded at date t by households supplying
labor to the firm is wt.
In this closed economy, aggregate wealth
equals the value of the aggregate capital stock.
The combined value of the debt and equity
each firm issues must equal the value of its capi-
tal. Some households may issue debt to each
other, but this does not change aggregate
wealth since the lending household’s asset is
offset by the borrowing household’s liability.
Therefore, the impact of tax reform on the real
value of the capital stock also determines its
impact on real aggregate wealth.
However, the distribution of the wealth
changes among households depends on how
tax reform affects the real value of firms’ and
households’ outstanding debt. If the real value
of debt is unchanged, changes in the value of 
a firm’s capital are borne solely by its equity
holders as residual claimants and there are no
wealth effects for households borrowing and
lending to each other. But if the real value of
outstanding debt changes, part of the change in
the value of capital is shifted to firms’ debt 
holders and wealth is also transferred between
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discusses only the impact of tax reform on the
real value of the capital stock. Part 2, which will
appear in a future issue of Economic and
Financial Review, will examine the effects on
the valuation of outstanding debt and the re-
sulting distributional implications.
I now consider the treatment of labor
supply and investment under the different tax
structures. It is simplest to assume that tax reve-
nues are rebated back to households.
Labor Supply and Investment Under 
Stylized Income Tax
In my initial simplified analysis, I consider
a pure, or stylized, income tax that accurately
measures and taxes net income. The base of this
stylized income tax is Y –  δ K, gross output
minus the depreciation of capital. The tax
allows depreciation deductions that match true
economic depreciation, δ K, and provides no tax
credits. Corporate dividends, corporate retained
earnings, and the capital income of noncorpo-
rate firms are taxed uniformly. A single tax rate
applies to all households, although there may
be a refundable exemption to provide relief for
poorer households. I later consider a somewhat
more realistic description of the federal income
tax that reflects the deferred liabilities it imposes
on many types of capital.
A well-established principle of public
finance states that in a stylized model of this
type, it makes no difference whether taxes are
collected from buyers or from sellers. It is sim-
plest to assume that a single firm carries out all
production and that the income tax is collected
from this firm. If τ y,t is the income tax rate at
time t, the firm’s tax liability is
(3) Tt = τ y,t[F(Kt,Lt,t) – δ Kt].
The firm chooses the quantity of labor L
and gross investment I to maximize the present
discounted value of Y – wL – I – T, which is its
payment to the savers who provide its funds,
subject to the constraints of Equations 1 and 2.
The first-order condition for labor is
With no taxes, the marginal product of labor
equals the wage rate. With income taxation, the
marginal product is higher than the wage rate,
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The first-order condition for investment
can be derived from the following analysis.
Consider a small deviation that increases the
capital stock by one unit at date t, followed at
time t + dt by an increase in consumption that
returns the capital stock to its original path. The
investment at date t reduces consumption by
one unit. Between t and t + dt, the additional
unit of capital depreciates to 1 – (δ dt) units but
produces FK,tdt units of output, on which taxes
of τ y,t(FK,t – δ )dt are paid. Consumption at date 
t + dt is 1 + (FK,t – δ )(1 – τ y,t)dt units. Since the
firm cannot have an incentive to deviate from
the optimal path, the consumption gained at 
t + dt must be 1 + (rdt) times greater than that
sacrificed at date t, which requires
It is easy to show that if savers demand a time-
varying rate of return, a condition of this form
holds at each instant using the contemporane-
ous rate of return. Also, with several types of
capital, each decaying at a different (geometric)
rate, a condition of this form holds separately
for each type.
With no taxes, the firm invests until the
pretax rate of return, FK – δ (marginal product
minus depreciation), equals savers’ required
after-tax rate of return. With income taxation,
however, this pretax return exceeds savers’
required after-tax rate of return. This wedge
between pretax and after-tax returns reflects 
an economic distortion between consumption
and saving, which is widely viewed as a major
disadvantage of the income tax. As shown
below, a constant-rate consumption tax avoids
this distortion.
Real Value of Capital Under Stylized Income Tax
I next examine the real value of capital,
which I define as the number of units of con-
sumption its owner(s) can obtain by selling 
one unit of capital and consuming the after-tax
proceeds. I show that under the maintained
assumptions, this value is always unity in the
no-tax economy and under the stylized income
tax, regardless of the age of the capital and the
income tax rate.
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This result follows from a simple arbitrage
relationship. With no adjustment costs and con-
stant costs of capital production, one unit of
new capital can be obtained at an opportunity
cost of one unit of consumption and is therefore
worth one unit of consumption. One unit of
existing capital—for example, the surviving












τ5 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
years ago—must have the same value as the
unit of new capital because both units have the
same marginal product and, under the stylized
income tax, are subject to the same taxes. Their
marginal products are the same because old and
new capital are perfect substitutes in produc-
tion. Each unit of capital, new or old, bears the
same tax, τ y,t(FK,t – δ ), at each date t.
A different calculation confirms that each
unit of capital is worth one unit of consumption.
The value of each unit of capital must equal the
present discounted value of its after-tax cash
flows. From Equation 6, the after-tax cash flow
(marginal product minus tax liability) is
(7) FK,t – τ y,t(FK,t – δ ) = r + δ .
For each unit of existing capital, this cash flow
declines at rate δ as the unit depreciates. So the
present value (discounted at rate r) of future
cash flow is
The real value of capital is always unity
under the stylized income tax, regardless of 
the tax rate or fluctuations in the production
function. The after-tax cash flow remains equal
to  r +  δ , due to changes in the quantity of 
capital (which alter its marginal product) or
changes in the after-tax rate of return. Due to
the infinite supply elasticity, fluctuations in the
production function or changes in the income
tax rate alter the quantity of capital or after-tax
returns but not the real value of each unit. Since
this result also holds for a zero tax rate, adop-
tion or repeal of the income tax does not
change the real value of capital.
Labor Supply and Investment Under 
Stylized Consumption Tax
I now consider the effects of a stylized
consumption tax. The tax base is consumption,
which equals gross output minus gross invest-
ment, Y – I, in accordance with Equation 1. The
stylized consumption tax differs from the styl-
ized income tax solely in deducting gross
investment rather than depreciation from gross
output. In other words, the firm may deduct
capital investment costs immediately rather than
as the capital depreciates. Many economists
have noted that an income tax can be trans-
formed into a consumption tax simply by
replacing depreciation allowances with expens-
ing, which is an immediate deduction for invest-
ment costs.
2
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The difference between this base and the
income tax base Y – δ K is net-of-depreciation
investment  I –  δ K, which, from Equation 2,
equals the change in the capital stock. In the
United States and other growing economies, the
capital stock increases over time, so net invest-
ment is positive and consumption is lower than
income. A stylized consumption tax requires a
higher tax rate than a stylized income tax to
meet a given revenue target.
In an economy with multiple firms, a con-
sumption tax can be collected in different ways.
A retail sales tax is collected solely from the firm
that sells to the consumer, while a value-added
tax is collected from firms at different stages of
the production process. A flat tax is similar to
the value-added tax but is collected partly from
firms’ workers. A personal consumption tax
(sometimes called a personal expenditures tax
or a consumed-income tax) is collected from
consumers. Koenig and Huffman (1998, 25–26),
Congressional Budget Office (1997, 7–22),
Gillis, Mieszkowski, and Zodrow (1996), McLure
and Zodrow (1996), Slemrod (1996), Auerbach
(1996, 43–46), Gravelle (1996a, 1423–28), and
Joint Committee on Taxation (1995, 51–52,
57–58) describe and compare these different
methods of imposing a consumption tax. Part 2
of this series will examine the differing implica-
tions of these taxes for the real value of out-
standing debt and for the distribution of wealth
changes across households.
However, since these taxes have econom-
ically similar effects on the real value of capital
and aggregate wealth, I do not distinguish them
here. I again assume the tax is collected from
the representative firm. Letting τ c denote the
consumption tax rate,
3 which is assumed to be
constant over time, the firm’s tax liability is
(9) Tt = τ c[F(Kt,Lt,t) – It].
The firm again chooses the quantity of labor L
and gross investment I to maximize the present
discounted value of Y – wL – I – T,
subject to Equations 1 and 2.
The first-order condition for labor is
unchanged from Equation 5, except that the
consumption tax rate replaces the income tax
rate,
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However, the first-order condition for in-
vestment takes a different form. Again, consider
a small deviation that increases the capital stock
by one unit at date t, followed at date t + dt by
an increase in consumption that returns the
capital stock to its original path. The investment
of one unit at date t provides tax savings of τ c,
so after-tax consumption falls by only (1 – τ c).
Between t and t + dt, the initial unit of capital
depreciates to 1 – ( δ dt) units but produces 
FK,tdt units of output. Pretax consumption at
date t + dt is 1 + (FK,t – δ )dt units, and after-
tax consumption is (1 –  τ c)[1 + (FK,t –  δ )dt].
Around the optimal path, the consumption
gained at date t + dt must be 1 + (rdt) times
greater than that sacrificed at date t, which re-
quires (1 – τ c)[1 + (FK,t – δ )dt] = (1 – τ c)[1 + (rdt)]
or
(12) FK,t = δ + r.
Unlike the income tax, the constant-rate
consumption tax does not impose a net tax 
burden on the marginal new investment. The
tax savings from expensing exactly offset (in
present discounted value) the taxes on the sub-
sequent cash flows. The reason is that the mar-
ginal unit of investment generates cash flows
with a present discounted value of exactly one
unit. Because there is no net tax burden, the
pretax rate of return equals savers’ required
after-tax rate of return, as in the no-tax econ-
omy. Unlike the income tax, the constant-rate
consumption tax does not distort the investment
decision.
4
Because it removes the wedge between
pretax and after-tax returns, the replacement of
the income tax by a constant-rate consumption
tax has major economic implications. It either
reduces the marginal product of capital or in-
creases the net return savers receive, or both. 
In the long run, both effects are likely to occur,
as after-tax returns rise to prompt more saving
and the resulting expansion of the capital stock
drives down the marginal product. The break-
down depends on the elasticity of investment
with respect to rates of return (the rate at which
marginal product declines as the capital stock
expands) and the corresponding elasticity of
saving.
Consider an example in which the depre-
ciation rate is 0.08. Assume that savers’ required
rate of return does not vary in response to tax
changes and always equals 0.04. If the actual
U.S. individual and corporate income taxes
were of the stylized form assumed in this sim-
plified analysis, a tax rate of about 20 percent or
slightly higher would be sufficient to raise cur-
rent revenues and provide a significant re-
fundable exemption. I compare this income tax
with a 25 percent consumption tax, which
would raise approximately the same revenue,
with a similar refundable exemption.
5 I use
these values—δ = 0.08, r = 0.04 (both before
and after tax reform), τ y = 0.2, τ c = 0.25—as a
standard example throughout this article. In 
the no-tax economy, the equilibrium marginal 
product is 0.12. With the 20 percent income tax,
the marginal product is 0.13, in accordance with
Equation 6; the pretax rate of return is 0.05; and
the tax payment is 0.01. With the 25 percent
consumption tax, the marginal product is 0.12,
in accordance with Equation 12. Since the con-
sumption tax payment is 0.03, the after-tax cash
flow is 0.09.
Using these parameters, Figure 1 illustrates
the source and timing of the consumption tax’s
favorable treatment of a marginal new invest-
ment. The figure compares the time paths of the
income and consumption tax payments that
result from one additional unit of gross invest-
ment, with no later change in gross investment.
The difference in timing is dramatic. The in-
come tax payment at each point in the life of
the investment is positive, declining as the capi-
tal depreciates. The initial consumption tax pay-
ment is negative, but subsequent payments are
positive and three times larger than under the
income tax (because the tax rate is higher and
depreciation is not deductible). As I explain be-
low, this timing difference plays a crucial role 
in the transition between the two tax systems.
One other effect of the consumption tax
should be mentioned. If the firm makes infra-
marginal investments that generate pure profits
Figure 1
Tax Payments Resulting from 
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(cash flows with present discounted value
greater than initial investment costs), the con-
sumption tax takes a fraction τ c of the profits.
However, since the firm still retains (1 – τ c) of
the pure profits and an investment with any
pure profits is worth making, the tax does not
deter any of these investments. (The income
tax, in addition to taking τ y of the pretax return
to the marginal investment, also takes τ y of any
pure profits generated by inframarginal invest-
ments.)
6
The consumption and income taxes have
different effects on investment incentives. I now
show that they also have different effects on the
real value of capital.
Real Value of Capital Under 
Stylized Consumption Tax
The expensing provided by the consump-
tion tax reduces the real value of each unit of
capital to (1 – τ c) units of consumption. The
opportunity cost of an additional unit of new
capital is now (1 –  τ c) units of consumption
because the investment provides τ c in tax sav-
ings. Conversely, since converting a unit of cap-
ital into one unit of consumption triggers a tax
payment of τ c, the net yield of such a conver-
sion is now only (1 – τ c).
The reduction in the real value of capital
is confirmed by a reduction in the present dis-
counted value of its cash flows. From Equa-
tion 12, the marginal product of each unit of
capital is r +  δ , so the after-tax cash flow is 
(1 – τ c)(r + δ ). With depreciation rate δ and dis-
count rate r, the present discounted value of
each unit’s cash flow is
The timing of the consumption tax causes the
lower value of capital. Tax savings at the date of
investment offset τ c units of the investment
costs. For the marginal investment, the subse-
quent after-tax cash flows (which must offset
the remainder of the costs) have a value of only
1 – τ c units. Each unit of existing capital has
already received the initial tax savings and has
only 1 – τ c units of remaining value.
Decomposing the Income and Consumption Taxes
The above analysis indicates that income
and consumption taxes are similar in one
respect but different in two others. Both taxes
distort the labor supply decision by driving a
wedge between the marginal product of labor























and the wage rates workers demand. However,
the income tax creates an additional distortion
by driving a wedge between the pretax and
after-tax rates of return on investment, while the
consumption tax does not. Also, the consump-
tion tax depresses the value of capital below its
pretax replacement cost, while the income tax
does not.
A decomposition of the taxes helps clarify
their similarities and differences. Define gross
capital income as gross income minus wages,
(14) YK,t = Yt – wtLt.
The stylized income tax consists of a tax on wages,
wL, plus a tax on net-of-depreciation capital 
income, YK – δ K. The consumption tax can also 
be decomposed. Combining Equations 1 and 14
reveals that consumption equals wages plus
capital income minus investment,
(15) Ct = wtL + (YK,t – It).
The excess of capital income over investment is
called business cash flow because it is the por-
tion of capital (or business) income that is not
used to produce new capital and that is distrib-
uted (flows back) to savers. Business cash flow
measures capital’s net contribution to consump-
tion (the output it produces minus the portion
reinvested to produce it). Equation 15 states that
consumption equals wages plus business cash
flow. If business cash flow is positive, as in the
United States, capital is productive, permitting
consumption to exceed wages.
7 A consumption
tax is a wage tax plus a business-cash-flow tax.
8
Figure 2 shows the relationship of these
quantities. Because cash flow is positive, wages
are lower than consumption. Because net invest-
ment is positive, as noted above, consumption
is lower than net income.
Figure 2
Relationship of Tax Bases
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Since the income and consumption taxes
both include a wage tax, it is useful to consider
its properties. The wage tax drives a wedge
between the pretax product of labor and the
after-tax wage rate and distorts the labor supply
decision. This explains why the income and
consumption taxes both have this effect.
However, the wage tax has no effect on
the investment decision or on the value of capi-
tal. An addition to Figure 1 charting the wage
tax payments triggered by an additional unit of
gross investment would show zero at every
date. The initial investment does not change the
wage tax, since output produced by labor is
taxed whether it is used as consumption or as
capital. The subsequent output the investment
generates is untaxed, because the wage tax
applies only to the marginal product of labor,
not capital. Each unit of capital is still worth one
unit of consumption.
The effects of the income and consump-
tion taxes on investment and the value of capi-
tal therefore arise from their net-capital-income-
tax and business-cash-flow-tax components rather
than their common wage-tax component. A net-
capital-income tax creates an investment dis-
tortion by imposing a tax burden on the mar-
ginal new investment. In contrast, a constant-rate
business-cash-flow tax creates no distortion be-
cause it imposes zero present-discounted-value
burden on the marginal new investment. With a
constant rate, a cash-flow tax is a lump-sum tax
that does not distort economic decisions.
Since business cash flow is positive and
substantial, the cash-flow tax raises significant
revenue. The tax is lump sum because this reve-
nue is not raised from labor or (in present dis-
counted value, on the margin) from new invest-
ment, the two economic activities that can be
distorted in this model. Where then does the
revenue come from? As noted above, the tax
collects revenue from any pure profits gener-
ated by inframarginal new investments; a tax on
pure profits has long been recognized as lump
sum. But the bulk of the revenue is collected
from the capital stock in existence when the tax
is introduced. It is well known that a tax on
existing capital is also lump sum. I now describe
the effects on existing capital in more detail.
SIMPLIFIED ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION
The above analysis permits a simple de-
scription of the transitional effects of repealing
a stylized income tax and introducing a con-
sumption tax. The change is assumed to be
unexpected. Under the stated assumptions, the
real value of the existing capital stock declines
by a proportion equal to the consumption tax
rate. This result has been widely noted and can
be regarded as canonical.
9
Real Value of Capital Declines by 
Proportion Equal to Tax Rate
Each unit of capital is worth one unit of
consumption under the stylized income tax and
(1 – τ c) units under the stylized consumption
tax. The tax reform therefore causes the real
value of capital to decline by proportion τ c. For
example, the introduction of a 25 percent con-
sumption tax reduces the value of existing capi-
tal by 25 percent.
Many believe the switch to a consumption
tax reduces the value of existing capital because
it increases the taxes on that capital. As ex-
plained below, this belief is largely incorrect.
However, it is useful to consider the change in
the tax burden on existing capital. These taxes
are likely to increase, largely because deprecia-
tion is no longer deductible. Also, if the tax
reform is revenue-neutral, the stylized con-
sumption tax rate is higher than the stylized
income tax rate was. (The tax increase can be
readily seen in Figure 1.) For any capital already
in existence on the reform date, the tax pay-
ments increase due to the midstream change.
Nevertheless, the devaluation of existing
capital does not occur because it is taxed more
heavily under the consumption tax than it was
under the income tax. The decline in value
equals the consumption tax rate, regardless of
whether any income tax previously existed or
what was done with it. For example, repealing
a 90 percent income tax and adopting a 25 
percent consumption tax (with spending cuts
financing the revenue shortfall) reduces the tax
burden on existing capital. Yet in this simplified
analysis, the real value of existing capital still
declines by 25 percent.
Instead, the existing capital stock is deval-
ued because it is taxed more heavily than new
investment. Existing capital declines in value
either when it is subjected to a tax increase from
which new capital is spared or when it is ex-
cluded from a tax cut given to new capital. The
relative treatment of existing and new capital is
crucial because they are perfect substitutes for
each other in production and have the same
marginal product.
For new investment to remain viable
under an income tax, the tax payments on it
must be offset by a marginal product that
exceeds savers’ required returns, as stated in
Equation 6. Since existing capital is a perfect9 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
substitute for new capital, it also enjoys this
higher marginal product (or lower required rate
of return). Therefore, the introduction of an
income tax or an increase in its rate does not
affect the value of existing capital. The marginal
product or the required return or both change
so that cash flow remains equal to r + δ , which
ensures the value remains equal to unity.
Under the consumption tax, however,
Equation 12 makes clear that the future tax 
payments from new investments are not offset
by a marginal product that exceeds savers’
required rate of return. Instead, they are offset
by the tax deduction granted on the date of
investment. Since this tax deduction is not 
given to the existing capital stock, it receives 
no offset for its future tax payments and its
value declines.
This point can be clarified by returning 
to the standard example, in which δ = 0.08, 
r = 0.04 (both before and after tax reform), 
τ y = 0.2, and τ c = 0.25. Column A of Table 1
shows that with the income tax, the marginal
product is 0.13 and the tax payment is 0.01, so
the after-tax cash flow is 0.12. As shown in col-
umn B, when the consumption tax replaces 
the income tax, the capital stock expands until
the marginal product falls from 0.13 to 0.12.
The consumption tax payment from each unit
of capital is 0.03, so the after-tax cash flow 
is 0.09.
The 25 percent decline in the value of
capital reflects the 25 percent decline in the
after-tax cash flow, from 0.12 to 0.09. Of the
0.03 decline in after-tax cash flow, 0.02 is due to
higher tax payments. Tax payments rise from
0.01 to 0.03, due to the higher consumption tax
rate and the loss of depreciation allowances.
The other 0.01 of the decline in after-tax cash
flow is due to the decline in pretax marginal
product, which is an equilibrium response to
the tax cut for new investment. The annual tax
burden on new investment under the income
tax is 0.01, but the effective annual burden
under the consumption tax is zero because
expensing offsets the 0.03 annual tax payment.
With an unchanged after-tax rate of return, the
0.01 effective tax reduction causes an expansion
of the capital stock that reduces the pretax 
marginal product by 0.01. In this case, two-
thirds of the reduction in value is due to a 
tax increase on existing capital; because new
investment is spared this increase, there is no
offsetting increase in the equilibrium pretax
marginal product. The other one-third is due 
to the exclusion of existing capital from a tax
cut given to new investment—a tax cut that 
drives down the equilibrium pretax marginal
product and thereby reduces the value of exist-
ing capital.
Column C shows the outcome with a 90
percent income tax. Replacing this onerous
income tax with a 25 percent consumption tax
provides a large tax cut of 0.33 to existing capi-
tal, reducing annual payments from 0.36 to 0.03.
However, it grants an even larger tax cut of 0.36
to new investment. (Its annual tax burden is
0.36 under the income tax but is effectively zero
under the consumption tax, due to expensing.)
In equilibrium, this 0.36 tax reduction causes
the capital stock to expand until the marginal
product falls from 0.48 to 0.12. Due to the 0.36
decline in marginal product, the after-tax cash
flow from existing capital falls by 0.03 despite
the 0.33 tax cut.
Regardless of the rate of the income tax
being replaced, the tax disparity between exist-
ing capital and new investment is 0.03, which is
25 percent of pretax marginal product. The
value of the existing capital therefore always
declines by 25 percent.
For simplicity, this standard example
makes the extreme assumption that tax reform
does not change the after-tax rate of return,
which remains equal to 0.04, while the capital
stock expands to drive the pretax rate of return
down to that value. Realistically, savers may
demand a higher after-tax return to provide the
additional funds required for this expansion.
However, this does not alter the conclusion 
that the real value of existing capital falls by 
25 percent. Consider the opposite assumption,
in which the pretax return remains equal to
0.05, while the after-tax return rises to this
value. (This extreme is also unrealistic since the
higher after-tax return is likely to prompt addi-
tional saving, which expands the capital stock
Table 1
Effect of Tax Reform on Existing Capital
(A) (B) (C)
20 percent 25 percent 90 percent
income tax consumption tax income tax
(τ y = .2) (τ c = .25) (τ y = .9)
Marginal product, FK .13 .12 .48
Pretax rate of return, FK – δ .05 .04 .40
Tax payment T .01 .03 .36
After-tax cash flow, FK – T .12 .09 .12
Present value, (FK – T )/(r + δ ) 1.00 .75 1.00
Income tax: FK = δ + [r/(1 – τ y)]; T = τ y(FK – δ )
Consumption tax: FK = δ + r; T = τ cFK
NOTE: δ = .08; both before and after tax reform, r = .04.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 10
and reduces the pretax rate of return.) The mar-
ginal product is 0.13, the consumption tax pay-
ment is 0.0325, and the after-tax cash flow is
0.0975. Although this cash flow is higher than in
the standard example, it must be discounted at
a higher after-tax rate of return. The value of
each unit of capital is
It can be seen that intermediate, more realistic
assumptions about the rate of return also yield
the same result.
Although these different assumptions
about after-tax returns result in the same value
of capital, they have different implications for
the well-being of wealth holders.
Wealth Holders Benefit from 
Higher After-Tax Rates of Return
The real value of the capital stock (aggre-
gate wealth) is not the only factor affecting the
well-being of its owners. This value merely
measures the consumption the owners can
obtain by immediately liquidating their wealth.
Since most wealth holders do not intend to con-
sume their entire wealth immediately, their
well-being also depends on the future rates of
return they will earn.
As discussed above, tax reform is likely to
cause after-tax returns to rise and pretax returns
to fall. The former effect is likely to be larger in
the short run because it takes time for additional
new investment to expand the capital stock and
drive down pretax returns. Therefore, wealth
holders are likely to enjoy significantly higher
after-tax returns for some time. Koenig and
Huffman (1998), Congressional Budget Office
(1997), Auerbach (1996), and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987, 66) provide quantitative esti-
mates.
For most wealth holders, the increase in
net returns mitigates the effects of switching to
a consumption tax. Consider a household with
initial wealth W that intends to consume at a
level rate over the next H years. If the after-tax
return is r, it consumes at an annual rate of
If the annual after-tax real return is initially 0.04,
a household with initial wealth equal to 100
units of consumption and a forty-year horizon
consumes 5.01 units per year. If tax reform
reduces its real wealth from 100 to 75 units but
raises the annual after-tax real return from 0.04
Wr














to 0.05, the household’s annual consumption
falls to 4.34 units. Consumption declines only 13
percent, not 25 percent. More dramatically, con-
sider a household that consumes nothing for H
years after the tax system changes and then
splurges by consuming W exp(rH ). With the
above parameters, a household that plans to
wait forty years can consume 554 units under
the consumption tax, an increase of 12 percent
from the 495 units available under the income
tax. Some wealth holders, therefore, may sup-
port the adoption of a consumption tax, despite
the reduction in the value of their wealth. Of
course, the rare household that consumes its
entire wealth immediately after tax reform is
unaffected by future returns and suffers the full
25 percent reduction in consumption.
10
The rise in after-tax returns is due to the
repeal of the income tax rather than the intro-
duction of the consumption tax. If the con-
sumption tax is introduced as a supplement to
the income tax (or as a replacement for a wage
tax), rates of return do not increase and all
wealth holders suffer a proportional decline in
consumption equal to the tax rate.
Effects of Transition Relief
Some consumption tax proposals call for
transition relief to mitigate or offset the decline
in the real value of existing capital. A simple
approach is to remove the business-cash-flow-
tax component of the consumption tax and
impose only a wage tax. Since the wage tax has
an even narrower base than the consumption
tax (Figure 2), a higher rate is necessary to raise
the same revenue, which imposes a heavier
burden on workers. Workers finance transition
relief for the owners of existing capital (and any
investors who receive pure profits). The higher
tax rate also exacerbates the labor supply dis-
tortion; since the cash-flow tax is lump sum, its
removal offers no offsetting efficiency gains.
As described above, a wage tax imposes
zero tax payments on investment at every date.
It does not distort the investment decision, and
the real value of capital remains equal to unity.
Replacing the income tax with a wage tax there-
fore leaves the value of existing capital un-
changed. Existing capital escapes any decline in
value because it receives the same tax reduc-
tion given to new investment. The effects of a
wage tax (for any rate) are shown in column C
of Table 2 for the standard example, in which 
δ = 0.08 and r = 0.04, both before and after tax
reform. Columns A and B are repeated from
Table 1 to show the effects of the 20 percent
income tax and 25 percent consumption tax.11 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
Since replacing the income tax with a wage tax
increases after-tax rates of return while leaving
the real value of wealth unchanged, it improves
the well-being of wealth holders.
11
A more modest (and more common) pro-
posal allows firms to deduct the depreciation
allowances on existing capital that they would
have deducted under the income tax. The reve-
nue loss from this relief also raises the tax rate
required to meet a given revenue target, which
exacerbates the labor supply distortion and
increases the burden on workers and any in-
vestors with pure profits. However, these effects
are smaller than under the wage-tax option.
This transition relief is insufficient to avoid
a decline in real value. As shown in column D
of Table 2, the provision of depreciation allow-
ances (with the consumption tax rate still equal
to 25 percent, for simplicity) results, for these
parameters, in a tax liability of 0.01 on existing
capital, the same as under the 20 percent income
tax. (With higher depreciation rates, it results in
a tax reduction; with lower depreciation, tax re-
form still increases tax liability but by less than
without relief.) However, the pretax marginal
product of capital still declines by 0.01, the equi-
librium response to the 0.01 tax cut for new
investment, so the after-tax cash flow falls from
0.12 to 0.11. Existing capital still declines in value,
though only by 8 percent rather than 25 percent.
As emphasized above, existing capital
declines in value if its tax treatment deteriorates
relative to new investment. Maintaining depreci-
ation deductions for existing capital is insuffi-
cient to prevent its devaluation because this
treatment is less generous than the expensing
provided for new investment. In general, it can
be shown that existing capital declines in value
by τ cr/(r + δ ) under this policy rather than by
the τ c that occurs without transition relief. This
form of transition relief is therefore more favor-
able to short-lived types of capital (those with
high δ ).
12
Limitations of Simplified Analysis
Several aspects of this simplified analysis
are unrealistic. The analysis does not reflect the
special treatment capital owned by consumers
and state and local governments would receive
under consumption tax proposals. Also, the styl-
ized income tax system does not accurately rep-
resent the U.S. income tax and the assumed 
production technology is unrealistic. The re-
mainder of this article extends the analysis to
address these limitations.
EXTENSION 1: SPECIAL TREATMENT OF 
CONSUMER AND GOVERNMENT CAPITAL
The simplified analysis assumes that all
production is done by a single firm and is
treated uniformly within each tax system. How-
ever, consumers and state and local govern-
ments, rather than private business firms, own
significant portions of the U.S. capital stock.
13
Consumer capital includes owner-occupied homes
and consumer durable goods; government capi-
tal includes public buildings and roads. These
Table 2
Effect of Transition Relief on Existing Capital
(A) (B) (C) (D)
20 percent 25 percent Depreciation
income tax consumption tax Wage tax relief
(τ y = .2) (τ c = .25) (any rate) (τ c = .25)
Marginal product, FK .13 .12 .12 .12
Pretax rate of return, FK – δ .05 .04 .04 .04
Tax payment T .01 .03 .00 .01
After-tax cash flow, FK – T .12 .09 .12 .11
Present value, (FK – T )/(r + δ ) 1.00 .75 1.00 .917
Income tax: FK = δ + [r/(1 – τ y)]; T = τ y(FK – δ )
Consumption tax: FK = δ + r; T = τ cFK
Wage tax: FK = δ + r; T = 0
Depreciation relief: FK = δ + r; T = τ c(FK – δ )
NOTE: δ = .08; both before and after tax reform, r = .04.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 12
types of capital are currently taxed differently
than they would be under a stylized income tax,
and they would be taxed differently under
major consumption tax proposals than they
would be under a stylized consumption tax.
Because of this different treatment, they escape
the decline in value other capital experiences
on the reform date.
Under the stylized income tax, the mar-
ginal product of this capital is taxed and its
depreciation is deducted. Under the stylized
consumption tax, the marginal product of this
capital is taxed and new production of such
capital is deducted. The marginal product of
consumer capital is its imputed rental value; the
marginal product of government capital is the
imputed value of the public services it pro-
duces. However, valuation difficulties arise
because these services are not sold in the mar-
ketplace; consumers do not pay rent to them-
selves, and governments generally provide 
public services without charge. Consumers and
recipients of public services receive the capital
income in-kind rather than as cash payments.
Whether due to these valuation difficulties
or other reasons, neither the current income tax
system nor leading consumption tax proposals
follow the stylized treatments described above.
The current system and the proposals take the
same approach to consumer and government
production, treating these sectors as they would
be treated by a wage tax. The current system
exempts them from the net-capital-income tax,
and the proposals exempt them from the busi-
ness-cash-flow tax.
At a private golf course, the income tax
applies to both the wages of course employees
and the net capital income the course generates.
At a municipal golf course, however, the federal
income tax applies only to the employees’
wages. The gross capital income of the course
is not taxed, and depreciation is not deducted.
For a rental housing unit, the income tax applies
both to the wages of the landlord’s employees
and the landlord’s net-of-depreciation capital
income. For an owner-occupied home, the 
income tax applies only to the wages of work-
ers who perform services (such as plumbers
and carpenters).
14 The home’s imputed rental
income is not taxed, and depreciation is not
deducted.
Similarly, proposed consumption taxes
apply to both the wages of the private course’s
employees and the course’s business cash flow,
its gross capital income minus new investment.
At the municipal course, however, the proposed
taxes apply only to the wages of course em-
ployees. The course’s gross capital income is not
taxed, and construction costs of new courses
are not deductible. For rental housing, both
wages and business cash flow are taxed. For
owner-occupied housing, only wages are taxed.
Imputed rental is not taxed, and new home con-
struction costs are not deductible.
One way to describe this treatment is that
the production of consumer and government
capital is treated as if it were consumption and 
the actual consumption subsequently produced
by this capital is ignored. Any “consumption”
tax that taxes investment as if it were consump-
tion and exempts the output produced by capi-
tal is simply a wage tax; only wages remain 
if business cash flow (capital income minus 
investment) is removed from the consumption
tax base.
Because wages in these sectors are taxed
in the same way as in the rest of the economy,
the income and consumption taxes affect labor
supply in these sectors in the manner indicated
by the general first-order conditions, Equations
5 and 11. Under the income tax, these sectors’
exemption from the tax on net capital income
causes a misallocation of capital. Since capital
income is untaxed in these sectors, the marginal
product of capital is δ + r.
15 However, the mar-
ginal product is δ + [r/(1 – τ y)] elsewhere, in
accordance with Equation 6. Pretax rates of re-
turn are higher for rental housing and private
golf courses than for owner-occupied housing
and municipal golf courses, implying that total
output increases if capital is shifted from the 
latter to the former.
The consequences of the disparate treat-
ment are less problematic under the consump-
tion tax. Since the business-cash-flow tax is
lump sum, its uneven application across sectors
does not distort investment decisions. The mar-
ginal product of capital is r + δ throughout the
economy, in accordance with Equation 12. To
be sure, the rental payments on a new rental
home are taxed, while the imputed rental of 
a new owner-occupied home is not. However,
the construction costs of the new rental home
are deductible, while those of the new owner-
occupied home are not. Since the present dis-
counted value of the rentals equals the con-
struction costs (for the marginal home), the
present discounted value of the tax burden is
zero in each case. Treating the original produc-
tion as consumption misstates the timing of con-
sumption but not its present discounted value.
16
Nevertheless, the disparate treatment has
important implications for the value of con-
sumer and government capital existing on the13 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
reform date. Since the value of capital is unity
under a wage tax, tax reform causes no decline
in value. On the reform date, owner-occupied
homes and municipal golf courses escape the
decline in value experienced by rental housing
and private golf courses.
17 Any pure profits 
generated by inframarginal investments of con-
sumers and state and local governments also
escape taxation.
Of course, the exemption of consumer
and state and local government capital from the
cash-flow tax reduces consumption tax revenue.
A higher tax rate is necessary to meet any given
revenue requirement, which exacerbates the
labor supply distortion and increases the tax
burden on workers, owners of other types of
existing capital, and any investors who receive
pure profits from other types of capital.
EXTENSION 2: INCOME TAX DEFERRAL
The simplified analysis assumes that the in-
come tax is a stylized tax that measures income
accurately and treats old and new capital neu-
trally. Under such a tax, the value of capital
equals its replacement cost. However, under more
realistic assumptions about the timing of the
income tax, many types of capital are already
worth less than replacement cost. Replacing the
income tax with a consumption tax therefore
causes a smaller reduction in (or may even
increase) the real value of existing capital.
Income Tax Deferral Reduces the 
Real Value of Capital
As explained above, the differing impact
of the stylized income and consumption taxes
on the real value of capital result from differ-
ences in their timing. The stylized income tax
collects the same tax from each unit of capital
regardless of age, while the consumption tax
grants an initial tax deduction offset by subse-
quent taxes (recall Figure 1). Unlike the stylized
income tax, the consumption tax is a deferred tax.
However, as detailed below, the federal
income tax system frequently imposes heavier
burdens on old capital than on new investment.
I show that this tax deferral reduces the real
value of capital below unity. A tax reform that
combines the introduction of a consumption tax
with repeal of the income tax reduces the value
of existing capital by less than the simplified
analysis concludes. In some cases, the value of
existing capital may increase.
Consider the standard example of a 20
percent income tax on a type of capital with a
0.08 depreciation rate, when the required after-
tax return is 0.04. Suppose instead that this type
of capital is tax exempt for the first 5.776 years
after it is produced and thereafter is subject to a
40 percent tax on its subsequent income. Since
this system imposes the same tax burden (in
present discounted value) as the 20 percent
income tax, the effective tax rate is 20 percent.
18
The equilibrium pretax return is still 0.05, and
the marginal product is still 0.13. Since all units
of capital, regardless of age, are perfect substi-
tutes in production, they all have this marginal
product.
However, the after-tax cash flow varies
with age. It is 0.13 for each unit of capital that
is less than 5.776 years old. Each unit of older
capital faces a tax of 0.4 (0.05), or 0.02, and has
an after-tax cash flow of 0.11. Due to this age-
varying treatment, the value of capital also
varies with age. Consider a unit of capital that is
more than 5.776 years old. Since its after-tax
marginal product is permanently 0.11, its real
value (with a depreciation rate of 0.08 and a dis-
count rate of 0.04) is 0.11/0.12, or 0.917.
Newly produced capital has an opportu-
nity cost of one unit of consumption and, by the
familiar arbitrage argument, is worth one unit of
consumption. But capital that is older than 5.776
years is worth only 0.917 units of consump-
tion.
19 The new capital is worth more because it
still has 5.776 tax-free years left, while the older
capital does not. It can also be shown that the
real value of capital gradually falls from 1 to
0.917 during its first 5.776 years as it uses up its
tax-free period.
Since the stylized income tax (which im-
poses the same tax on capital of all ages) does
not reduce value, the devaluation arises solely
from the fact that the tax burden is greater in the
later part of the investment’s life. It is helpful to
view the deferred taxes as a liability the owners
of capital owe the government. The economic
burden of the tax system is 0.01 at all ages, since
marginal product always exceeds r + δ by this
amount. During the tax-free period, the owners
effectively borrow from the government. Later,
when they are paying 0.02, they effectively ser-
vice this loan. The outstanding liability reduces
the value of the capital. Indeed, the same effect
could be achieved by imposing the 20 percent
uniform tax and making an explicit loan. The
capital, encumbered by the debt, would be
worth less than unity.
This devaluation has implications for the
effects of tax reform. Replacing the income tax
with a 25 percent consumption tax reduces the
value of each unit of existing capital (that is
more than 5.776 years old) by only 18 percent,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 14
from 0.917 to 0.75. Income tax repeal effectively
forgives the deferred tax liability and increases
the value of the capital, partly offsetting the 25
percent decline caused by the introduction of
the consumption tax.
Therefore, to the extent current income
taxes are imposed on a deferred basis, capital is
already valued at less than replacement cost and
the replacement of the income tax by a con-
sumption tax has a smaller impact than the 
previous analysis suggests. If the devaluation
under the income tax is sufficiently large, the
switch to consumption taxation may even raise
the real value of existing capital.
Note that the offsetting rise in value is due to
the repeal of the income tax (and its associated
deferred liabilities) rather than the introduction of
the consumption tax. If a consumption tax is intro-
duced as a supplement to the income tax (or as a
replacement for a wage tax), the value of existing
capital still declines by a proportion equal to the
consumption tax rate, as in the simplified analysis.
Similarly, if the consumption tax rate is subse-
quently raised to meet an increase in revenue
needs, the real value of existing capital still de-
clines by a proportion equal to the rate increase.
As described below, numerous instances
of deferred taxation exist in the current system.
Front-loaded investment and saving incentives
result in deferred taxation. Also, under one 
theory of corporate financial policy, the taxation
of corporate dividends at a higher rate than re-
tained corporate earnings results in tax deferral.
Front-Loaded Investment Incentives
Front-loaded investment incentives include
expensing, investment tax credits, and acceler-
ated depreciation.
20 Current income tax law
allows the cost of some investments to be ex-
pensed (as all investment would be under a
consumption tax) rather than depreciated. Most
intangible investments—such as research and
development, worker training, and business
planning—can be expensed. Small businesses
are allowed to expense $20,000 (scheduled to
rise to $25,000 by 2003) of equipment invest-
ment per year. Each unit of expensed capital is
worth (1 – τ y) under the income tax, so the net
change resulting from tax reform is (τ y – τ c).
In some instances, the income tax allows
a credit against tax liability equal to a fraction k
of investment costs when the investment is
made. Each unit of capital then has a value of
about (1 – k), depending on how depreciation
allowances are adjusted to account for the
credit. Although the general credit for equip-
ment investment was abolished in 1986, U.S. tax
law still provides a 20 percent credit for re-
search and experimentation, a 10 percent credit
for business equipment that uses solar or geo-
thermal energy, and a 10 percent to 20 percent
credit for rehabilitation of historic structures.
Under accelerated depreciation, the tax
law computes depreciation deductions as if 
capital depreciates more rapidly than it does.
For example, capital with a 0.08 depreciation
rate may be depreciated for tax purposes at 
a 0.12 rate. One unit of investment results in 
a depreciation deduction t years later of 0.12
exp(–0.12t), rather than the true depreciation of
0.08 exp(–0.08t). The deductions are higher
than true depreciation for capital that is less
than 10.137 years old and lower for capital that
is older. This deferral of tax liability results in
capital having a value less than unity. The tax
law provides accelerated depreciation for nearly
all types of tangible capital.
Front-Loaded Personal Savings Incentives
Another form of deferred income taxation
is the provision of front-loaded incentives for
personal saving. The amount saved is deducted
and the proceeds are fully taxed when with-
drawn from a designated account. These in-
centives apply to pensions, conventional indi-
vidual retirement accounts (IRAs), 401(k)s,
403(b)s, medical savings accounts, education
IRAs, and Keogh accounts for self-employed
taxpayers. In some cases, a 10 percent penalty
may also apply to withdrawals. The taxation of
the proceeds reduces the value of the assets 
to (1 – τ y) or, if the penalty is applicable, to 
(0.9 – τ y). Repeal of the individual income tax
forgives the tax and penalty.
21
The incentives provided to Roth IRAs do
not have the same effects. The household re-
ceives no deduction for the original saving, but
the return on the account is exempt. Although
these incentives are often referred to as back-
loaded, their timing is actually neutral. There is
no deferral because the same zero tax rate
applies at all times. Income tax repeal does not
increase the net value of Roth IRAs.
Another instance of deferred taxation is
the delay in taxing capital gains until the gains
are realized. Repeal of the income tax forgives
the tax on unrealized capital gains.
22
Taxation of Corporate Dividends 
and Retained Earnings
Another potential source of deferred taxa-
tion has broad applicability. Shareholders in
many corporations must pay individual income
tax on dividends and on the capital gains that15 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
result from corporate retained earnings (in 
addition to the corporate income tax imposed 
at the firm level).
23 The tax on dividends is 
generally higher than the effective tax on re-
tained earnings. Under one theory of corporate
financial policy, this differential taxation is a
deferral of tax liability and reduces the value of
existing capital.
Consider a corporation that uses equity to
finance all its investment. Let ISSUE denote the
funds raised by issuing and selling new shares,
DIV denote the dividends paid to existing share-
holders (gross of dividend tax), and RETAIN
denote the earnings retained on behalf of exist-
ing shareholders. The business cash flow dis-
tributed to stockholders consists of dividend
payments to existing stockholders minus equity
issuance proceeds received from new stock-
holders. By definition, business cash flow equals
gross capital income minus gross investment, so
DIV – ISSUE = YK – I. Retained earnings equal
the net increase in the capital stock existing
stockholders own, consisting of the increase 
in the firm’s capital stock (gross investment
minus depreciation) minus the portion sold to
new stockholders, so RETAIN = (I – δ K ) – ISSUE.
Rewriting these equations yields
(16) DIVt + RETAINt = YK,t – δ Kt;
RETAINt + ISSUEt = It – δ Kt.
For given values of real variables (capital in-
come, investment, and depreciation), Equation
16 places two restrictions on the three financial
variables (dividends, equity issuance, and retained
earnings). The corporation has one degree of
freedom in choosing its financial policy.
If a common tax rate τ applies to both divi-
dends and retained earnings, the liability under
any financial policy satisfying Equation 16 is
(17) Tt = τ (DIVt + RETAINt) = τ (YK,t – δ Kt).
Regardless of the corporation’s financial policy,
this is simply a tax on net capital income with
no tax deferral.
However, since the federal income tax sys-
tem offers a preferential tax rate on long-term
capital gains, the dividend tax rate, τ d, exceeds
the effective tax rate on retained earnings, τ r.
Because this system treats different financial
flows differently, its effects depend on the cor-
poration’s financial policy.
Economists have considered two major
theories of corporate financial policy. The earli-
est theory, generally called the “old” or “tradi-
tional” view, assumes that firms pay dividends
equal to a fixed fraction x of their net capital
income, which implies
(18) DIVt = x(YK,t – δ Kt);
RETAINt = (1 – x)(YK,t – δ Kt);
ISSUEt = It – (1 – x)YK,t – xδ Kt.
Since increases in I result in one-for-one in-
creases in ISSUE with no changes in DIV or
RETAIN, new share issuance is the marginal
source of finance for new investment.
Under this theory, the tax imposed on
stockholders is
(19) Tt = τ dDIVt + τ rRETAINt
= [x τ d + (1 – x)τ r](YK,t – δ Kt).
Under the old view, the system imposes a tax
on net capital income, with the effective rate
equal to a weighted average of the rates on div-
idends and retained earnings. The lower rate on
retained earnings merely reduces the overall 
tax rate with no deferral. Since investment is
financed from new share issuance, with no
change in dividends or retained earnings, no tax
saving or payment occurs at the time of invest-
ment. The subsequent output from the invest-
ment generates a stable mixture of dividends
and retained earnings at each date, so its tax
treatment is the same at each date.
However, King (1974) and later writers
challenge the old view’s assumption that the
corporation simultaneously issues new equity
and pays dividends. Even in the no-tax econ-
omy, raising funds from new stockholders and
paying them to current stockholders generates
unnecessary transaction costs. More important,
this behavior raises shareholders’ taxes. Lower-
ing both dividends and share issuance by one
dollar, which increases retained earnings by one
dollar, reduces taxes by (τ d – τ r). Also, the small
amount of equity issuance by mature corpora-
tions casts doubt on the old view’s assertion that
such issuance is the marginal source of invest-
ment finance.
King and those who followed him advo-
cate an alternative theory of corporate financial
behavior, known as the “new view.”
24 Under this
theory, a mature corporation, defined as one
with positive cash flow, pays dividends equal to
its business cash flow and issues no new equity:
(20) DIVt = YK,t – It; RETAINt = It – δ Kt;
ISSUEt = 0.
Since increases in I result in one-for-one in-
creases in RETAIN and decreases in DIV, with
no change in ISSUE, retained earnings (foregone
dividends) are the marginal source of finance
for new investment.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 16
Under this theory, the tax imposed on
equity holders equals
(21) Tt = τ dDIVt + τ rRETAINt
= τ r(YK,t – δ Kt) + (τ d – τ r)(YK,t – It).
The tax combines a net-capital-income tax with
effective rate τ r and a cash-flow tax with effec-
tive rate equal to (τ d – τ r), the “extra” tax on
dividends. Under the new view, the extra divi-
dend tax is a deferred tax. Since new investment
is financed by retained earnings (a reduction in
dividends), a tax savings of (τ d – τ r) is received
at the time of investment. The subsequent out-
put is distributed as dividends, in accordance
with Equation 20, on which taxes are imposed.
This tax timing—an initial tax savings offset by
subsequent tax payments—is similar to that of
the consumption tax and front-loaded invest-
ment incentives.
Under the new view, only the tax on
retained earnings (capital gains) is a net-income
tax that distorts investment. The extra tax on
dividends is a business-cash-flow tax that leaves
investment undistorted but reduces the value of
capital to 1 – τ d + τ r. The combined effect of
income tax repeal and introduction of a con-
sumption tax at rate τ c is to change the capital
stock’s value by (τ d – τ r – τ c). The real value of
existing capital may even increase, depending
on the tax rates.
Although the new view is a theoretically
appealing description of the behavior of mature
corporations with positive business cash flow,
its validity remains controversial. Zodrow (1991)
reports that some empirical evidence favors the
old view, while Auerbach and Hassett (2000)
report evidence favoring the new view. Zodrow
discusses the difficulty of conclusively testing
the two theories, particularly in light of addi-
tional modifications (not considered here) that
can be made to each, including models of the
interaction of equity and debt finance.
EXTENSION 3: ADJUSTMENT COSTS
Incorporating more realistic assumptions
about production generally (but not always)
mitigates the decline in value implied by the
simplified analysis.
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The simplified analysis assumes the supply
of capital is infinitely elastic because unlimited
amounts of each type of capital can be pro-
duced and installed at constant cost (in terms of
consumption). It is more realistic to assume that
capital’s marginal production cost rises when
economy-wide production increases. Also, some
evidence suggests adjustment costs exist at the
firm level, causing the marginal installation costs
of capital at each firm to rise when the firm in-
stalls more capital. Since both forces have similar
implications when investment increases through-
out the economy, I discuss them together and
refer to them as adjustment costs.
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As discussed previously, tax reform is
likely to cause the aggregate capital stock to
expand, so that the equilibrium pretax rate of
return is reduced. With adjustment costs, this
expansion is associated with a rise in the cost of
capital goods, which mitigates the decline in
value for existing capital. Adjustment costs also
restrain the expansion of the capital stock.
With adjustment costs, the pretax rate of
return equals (FK + q ·)/q – δ rather than FK – δ ,
where q is pretax replacement cost and the dot
denotes rate of change. Dividing by q is neces-
sary because q units of consumption must be
sacrificed to obtain one unit of capital. Adding
the change in q is necessary to reflect the capital
gain (or loss) earned by holding capital. The first-
order conditions for investment under income
and consumption taxation are (respectively)
rather than Equations 6 and 12. If the after-tax
required return r remains constant, the pretax
return still declines after tax reform, but a
decline in FK is now only part of the likely
response (and is smaller because the capital
stock does not expand as much). Another part
is a rise in q (and still another is a negative
value of q · since the increase in q following tax
reform is likely to decay over time). Ignoring
the income tax deferral considered above, each
unit of capital is still valued at q  under the
income tax and (1 – τ c)q under the consump-
tion tax. However, this no longer implies a 
proportional decline of τ c, because q is higher
under the consumption tax.
Note that the increase in investment and
the resulting rise in q are due to the repeal of
the income tax rather than the introduction of
the consumption tax. If a consumption tax is
introduced as a supplement to the income tax
(or as a replacement for a wage tax), the value
of existing capital is still likely to decline by a
proportion equal to the consumption tax rate, as
in the simplified analysis. Similarly, if the con-
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increased revenue needs, the real value of exist-
ing capital is still likely to decline by a propor-
tion equal to the rate increase.
In the simplified analysis, the decline in
value is always τ c, regardless of the response of
r to tax reform; if r rises, it simply dampens the
decline in FK. With adjustment costs, however,
an increase in r dampens the rise in q as well as
the decline in FK. If after-tax rates of return rise,
the decline in value of existing capital is greater
than it would otherwise be.
The extreme form of adjustment costs
occurs when adjustment is impossible and the
quantity of capital is fixed; additional units can-
not be produced at any cost and the existing
units cannot be converted back into consump-
tion. If all types of capital are in fixed supply
and changes in labor supply are unimportant,
the marginal product of capital is unchanged by
tax reform. Consider the standard example, in
which δ = 0.08 and r = 0.04 both before and
after tax reform. With no adjustment costs, the
marginal product declines from 0.13 to 0.12 and
the value falls from 1 to 0.75. But if capital is in
fixed supply and the marginal product remains
unchanged at 0.13, the value of each unit of
capital is
and the decline in value is 19 percent rather
than 25 percent. If some adjustment costs are
present, but capital is not in fixed supply, an
intermediate outcome occurs. Also, if tax reform
raises the required after-tax return, the decline
in value is greater than 19 percent, even under
the fixed-supply assumption.
Adjustment costs have opposite implica-
tions for lightly taxed types of capital. Consider
a system in which some types of capital face
effective tax rates of 30 percent and others face
effective rates of zero. If the after-tax rate of
return is initially 0.04, pretax rates of return are
0.057 for the former and 0.04 for the latter. If tax
reform causes the after-tax rate of return to rise
to .045, the stock of the heavily taxed capital
expands until its pretax rate of return falls from
0.057 to 0.045, while the stock of the untaxed
capital contracts until its pretax rate of return
rises from 0.04 to 0.045. The untaxed capital
does not benefit from tax reform, and it is
crowded out by the rise in after-tax interest
rates.
Therefore, untaxed (or lightly taxed) types
of capital are likely to contract rather than













sis is then reversed. Adjustment costs reduce the
replacement cost of these types of capital, re-
inforcing any decline in the value of existing
capital. As noted above, consumer and govern-
ment capital is not taxed, while many types of
intangible capital face effective tax rates of zero
because they are expensed. This analysis is
likely to apply to these types of capital.
27
POTENTIAL MAGNITUDES OF EFFECTS
This section combines the various exten-
sions discussed above and incorporates them into
the simplified analysis. The aggregate decline in
value is smaller than the simplified analysis sug-
gests, but its distribution is less uniform.
Table 3 summarizes the possible impacts
for five categories of capital. (Even so, the
analysis is somewhat aggregated; the actual
impact may vary significantly across different
types of capital within each category.) The con-
sumption tax rate is assumed to be 25 percent.
Column A lists the percentage declines that
apply when there is no income tax deferral and
no adjustment costs. Column B lists the modifi-
cation attributable to front-loaded investment
incentives. Column C lists the modification
attributable to adjustment costs; due to uncer-
tainty about the magnitude, only the sign of 
the effect is reported. Column D combines
columns A through C. Column E states the
appropriate modification if the new view is
valid, and column F combines that modification
with column D.
The first row refers to consumer and gov-
ernment capital. Column A shows zero because
this capital is exempt from the cash flow tax.
The entry in column B is also zero because this
capital does not receive any front-loaded invest-
ment incentives. Its preferential treatment under
the current income tax consists of facing a zero
tax rate at every stage of its life.
Column C reports a negative effect be-
cause consumer capital and government capital
are exempt from income tax and are likely to
contract after tax reform, as discussed above.
Congressional Budget Office (1997, 45–46) and
Gravelle (1996b) survey the literature on possi-
ble reductions in value of the largest category of
consumer capital, owner-occupied homes. Allow-
ing for some increase in after-tax interest rates,
Gravelle estimates that homes would decline in
value by about 22 percent under the extreme
assumption that they are in fixed supply. With
more realistic assumptions about the magnitude
of adjustment costs, however, she concludes
that the decline may be as low as 9 percent.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 18
The entry in column E is zero because the
new view is inapplicable to noncorporate capi-
tal, including consumer and government capital.
The net impact shown in columns D and F is a
value decline whose magnitude depends on
adjustment costs.
The next two rows refer to tangible capital,
such as plant and equipment. The first of these
rows refers to investment for which the new
view is inapplicable. This includes debt-financed
corporate investment, equity-financed investment
by immature corporations with negative cash flow,
and investment by noncorporate firms (proprie-
torships, partnerships, and limited liability com-
panies) and S corporations that are taxed in the
same manner as noncorporate firms. The other
row refers to investment for which the new view
(if valid) is applicable, which is equity-financed
investment by corporations (other than S corpo-
rations) with positive cash flow.
Under the simplified analysis, the value of
tangible capital declines by 25 percent, as
shown in column A. However, this type of capi-
tal has deferred tax liabilities due to accelerated
depreciation and other front-loaded invest-
ment incentives. Following Auerbach (1996, 51),
I assume these incentives reduce the value of
this capital by an average of 8 percent and enter
this number in column B.
I report a positive effect in column C,
since this type of capital should expand after tax
reform and adjustment costs should increase 
its value. The magnitude is highly uncertain.
Auerbach (1996, 62) estimates an increase of
about 10 percent under one assumption about
adjustment costs but notes that a smaller or
larger increase is possible.
The combined effect shown in column D is
a decline in value of less than 17 percent. An in-
crease is possible if adjustment costs are quite large.
For equity-financed investment by mature
corporations, the net impact is more favorable,
if the new view is valid. This is the category
Koenig and Huffman (1998) consider. Following
their assumption that dividends are taxed at 25
percent and capital gains at zero, I enter 25 per-
cent in column E. The net impact is an increase
in value of more than 8 percent. If the old view
is valid, this adjustment does not apply.
The last two rows refer to intangible capi-
tal, again distinguishing between capital for
which the new view (if valid) is applicable and
that for which it is inapplicable. The initial
impact is 25 percent. Because this capital is
expensed, it is currently devalued by a propor-
tion equal to the income tax rate. I enter 35 per-
cent, the top corporate income tax rate, in col-
umn B. The adjustment-costs effect is negative
since, as explained above, tax reform is likely to
reduce investment in this capital. The net im-
pact is an increase in value of less than 10 per-
cent. The value may decline if adjustment costs
are sufficiently large. For equity-financed invest-
ment by mature corporations, the net impact is
an increase in value of less than 35 percent, if
the new view is valid.
These estimates do not include front-
loaded saving incentives. The removal of the
income tax (and penalty) on withdrawals from
employer pension plans and tax-deferred
accounts constitutes an increase in value that
should be added to the numbers in Table 3.
Table 3
Summary of Transition Effects on Real Value of Capital
Percentage change in value from replacement of income tax with 25 percent consumption tax
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Front-loaded Net effect Additional Net effect
Simplified investment Adjustment (if old view effect (if new (if new view
analysis* incentives costs is valid) view is valid) is valid)
Consumer and government capital 0 0 < 0 < 0 0 < 0
Tangible capital except equity- –25 8 > 0 > –17 0 > –17
financed mature corporation
Tangible capital, equity-financed –25 8 > 0 > –17 25 > 8
mature corporation
Intangible capital except equity- –25 35 < 0 < 10 0 < 10
financed mature corporation
Intangible capital, equity-financed –25 35 < 0 < 10 25 < 35
mature corporation
* Modified to reflect special treatment of consumer and government capital.19 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
CONCLUSION
Replacing income taxation with consump-
tion taxation would have wide-ranging effects
on the value of the capital stock. A simple result
can be obtained by assuming that the income
and consumption taxes have stylized forms and
that capital goods can be produced at constant
cost (with no adjustment costs). In this simpli-
fied analysis, the real value of existing capital
would decline by a proportion equal to the con-
sumption tax rate. This decline would occur
because existing capital would be treated less
favorably than new investment. The harm to
owners of existing capital would be mitigated
because income tax repeal would increase after-
tax rates of return.
However, under a more realistic specifica-
tion of the consumption tax, consumer and 
government capital would receive preferential
treatment that would allow them to escape 
this value decline. Also, under more realistic
assumptions about income tax design and the
production process, income tax repeal would
offset part of the negative impact from the intro-
duction of the consumption tax. Income tax
repeal would enhance the value of business
capital by forgiving deferred tax liabilities.
Repeal would also increase investment in many
types of business capital, which, in the presence
of adjustment costs, would drive up the value of
existing capital. However, repeal would reduce
investment in consumer and government capital
and some lightly taxed forms of business capi-
tal, which would drive down their real value.
The net result is that the decline in the real
value of existing capital is smaller and less uni-
form than the simplified analysis suggests. Some
types of capital might even rise in value. The
reduced overall impact on the real value of
capital weakens the argument for broad transi-
tion relief. However, the uneven nature of the
effects might support an argument for targeted
relief for types of capital that are more adversely
affected. Uncertainty about the magnitude of
adjustment costs and the appropriate theory 
of corporate financial behavior complicates de-
cisions on transition policies.
The analysis in this article offers an incom-
plete description of the transition. The distribu-
tion of the wealth decline depends on how tax
reform affects the real value of outstanding
debt. What are the relative effects on stockhold-
ers and bondholders? When owner-occupied
homes decline in value, is the loss borne fully
by the owners, or do mortgage lenders bear part
of the loss? In Part 2, I address these issues.
NOTES
I am grateful to Mark Wynne, Mine Yücel, Gregory
Huffman, and V. Brian Viard for extremely helpful
comments and to Monica Reeves for careful editing.
1 Many authors discuss this result, including Bradford
(2000, 319–25), Lyon (1990), Sandmo (1979),
Johansson (1969), and Samuelson (1964).
2 See Koenig and Huffman (1998, 31), Gentry and
Hubbard (1997, 8), Gravelle (1996a, 1427), Joint
Committee on Taxation (1995, 57), and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987, 133).
3 I express the tax rate in a tax-inclusive manner rather
than the tax-exclusive manner in which retail sales tax
rates are usually expressed. For example, the sales
tax rate is usually said to be 33.33 percent if a $33.33
tax is imposed on a consumption good with a pretax
price of $100 and an after-tax price of $133.33. I refer
to this levy as a 25 percent tax (τ c equals 25 percent)
because the tax is 25 percent of the after-tax price.
The tax-inclusive approach is consistent with the 
manner in which income tax rates are stated. Koenig
(1999, 685), Gale (1999, 443–44), Gillis, Mieszkowski,
and Zodrow (1996, 730, note 17), and Joint Committee
on Taxation (1995, 54, note 83) discuss the relation-
ship between tax-exclusive and tax-inclusive rates.
4 A time-varying consumption tax rate is distortionary
because it penalizes investment in years when the tax
rate is temporarily low. Time-varying rates generally
pose greater difficulties for consumption taxes than for
income taxes. See Bradford (2000, 311–31) and
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 62, 83–87).
5 Estimates of the revenue-neutral consumption tax rate
include 21.8 percent (Koenig 1999, 697); 27.7 percent
(Gale 1999, 455, replacing excise as well as income
taxes and allowing for tax avoidance and evasion and
base erosion); 25.2 percent to 25.7 percent (Ventura 1999,
1445, imposing revenue neutrality only in steady state);
and 21.4 percent (Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba 1997, 75).
The Treasury Department has also estimated a revenue-
neutral rate of about 25 percent. Gilles, Mieszkowski,
and Zodrow (1996, 763) make a similar estimate.
6 Bradford (2000, 71–72, 91–92), Gentry and Hubbard
(1997, 6), Congressional Budget Office (1997, 29),
and Joint Committee on Taxation (1995, 58, note 94)
discuss the taxation of pure profits. Also, in an econ-
omy with uncertainty, the returns from various risky
investments may be higher or lower than the return on
a safe investment. Under the income and consumption
taxes, the government shares in these surpluses and
shortfalls in the proportions τ y and τ c, respectively. 
The market value of the surpluses and shortfalls is
zero, as Bradford (2000, 93; 1996, 129) and Gentry
and Hubbard (1997, 7–9) explain. Also, see Joint
Committee on Taxation (1995, 94–99).
7 Abel et al. (1989) demonstrate that business cash flow
has been consistently positive in the United States. If itFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 20
were consistently negative, more resources would be
devoted to producing capital than were produced by
it. Such an economy would be considered dynamically
inefficient because it could increase both current and
future consumption by reducing its capital stock.
8 Bradford (2000, 68), Koenig and Huffman (1998, 26),
Gentry and Hubbard (1997, 5), Congressional Budget
Office (1997, 66), Auerbach (1996, 30–31), and Joint
Committee on Taxation (1995, 55) note this equivalence.
9 See Bradford (2000, 80, 99), Diamond and Zodrow
(1999, 25), Lyon and Merrill (1999, 308), Hall (1997,
147), Congressional Budget Office (1997, 66),
Auerbach (1996, 47) and Gravelle (1996a, 1443).
These authors differ in the extent to which they
acknowledge the qualifications to this conclusion that 
I address in the text when I modify the simplified
analysis. Lewis and Seidman (2000, 100), Gentry and
Hubbard (1997, 10–11), Feenberg, Mitrusi, and
Poterba (1997, 85), Gillis, Meiszkowski, and Zodrow
(1996, 747), Joint Committee on Taxation (1995, 84),
and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 62, 79) also note in
more general terms that the adoption of a consump-
tion tax reduces the real value of existing wealth.
10 Lewis and Seidman (2000), Diamond and Zodrow
(1999, 26), Congressional Budget Office (1997, 67),
Gentry and Hubbard (1997, 11), Feenberg, Mitrusi,
and Poterba (1997, 85), Gillis, Mieszkowski, and
Zodrow (1996, 748), Auerbach (1996, 60), Bradford
(1996, 139–40), and Joint Committee on Taxation
(1995, 87) note the effects of higher after-tax returns.
In the text, I consider households that experience a
wealth decline equal to the 25 percent reduction in the
value of the capital stock (aggregate wealth). Recall
that this article does not address how the wealth
decline is divided between debt and equity holders 
or household lenders and borrowers. I will explain in
Part 2 that wealth changes may vary greatly across
households with different portfolios.
11 A related approach maintains the cash-flow tax but
gives each unit of existing capital offsetting rebates
with a present value of τ c. This may be done through
an immediate rebate of τ c or, as Bradford (2000,
327–28) discusses, a permanent stream of rebates
equal to τ c(δ + r) exp(–δ t) in year t. The rebate
approach differs from the wage-tax option only in 
taxing any future pure profits and maintaining the
appearance of a tax on capital.
12 Bradford (2000, 110; 1996, 143) discusses the relative
treatment of long-lived and short-lived capital under
this transition policy.
13 The federal government also holds capital. It is 
economically irrelevant, however, whether the federal
government taxes itself on this capital. Capital held by
nonprofit organizations would also receive preferential
treatment under the major consumption tax proposals,
and the analysis in the text generally applies to this
capital.
14 If homeowners perform their own services, their im-
puted wages are also exempt from income tax and
proposed consumption taxes. This exemption distorts
the allocation of labor but has no implications for the
valuation of capital.
15 This statement assumes that state and local govern-
ments make their investment decisions using the same
profit-maximization criteria as private firms. In reality,
their decisions may be affected by a variety of political
factors.
16 Some argue that the difficulty of measuring these
imputed service flows is a disadvantage of the con-
sumption tax. The opposite is true, since the exemp-
tion of these flows causes capital misallocation under
the income tax but not under the consumption tax.
Capital income must be measured to be taxed at a
positive rate but need not be if it is to be taxed at a
zero effective rate, which is the objective of the
consumption tax. See Bradford (2000, 10–12, 94–95).
17 Bradford (2000, 107; 1996, 140), Lewis and Seidman
(2000, 100), Diamond and Zodrow (1999, 25), Hall
(1997, 149), Congressional Budget Office (1997,
66–67), and Sullivan (1996, 342) note that consumer
capital escapes the decline in value that affects other
capital. In the absence of special rules, the preferential
treatment applies to capital consumers and govern-
ments own on the reform date, regardless of subse-
quent transactions. For example, housing that is
owner-occupied on that date still benefits, even if it 
is converted to rental use the next day; although
subsequent rental payments are taxed, an immediate
deduction equal to the home’s value is granted
because the conversion is treated as new investment.
Conversely, housing used for rental on the reform date
does not benefit, even if it is converted to owner use
the next day; although the owner’s subsequent imputed
rental income is exempt, an immediate tax is imposed
on the home’s value because the conversion is treated
as disinvestment and consumption.
18 This equivalence follows because
.4∫
∞
t=5.776 exp(–.12t)dt = .2∫
∞
t=0 exp(–.12t)dt.
Note that exp[–(5.776)(.12)] equals 0.5.
19 If firms can convert a unit of older capital back into
one unit of consumption without any tax liability, the
value of this capital cannot fall below unity. Indeed, no
older capital remains in existence since all firms make
such conversions. To prevent this outcome, the tax
system must require the firm to pay a tax of 0.083 units
to recapture the benefits of the earlier tax-free period.
Under the federal income tax, most front-loaded
investment incentives are accompanied by recapture
taxes. Since the tax law often allows firms that pur-
chase existing capital from other firms to claim the
same front-loaded benefits as if they had produced
new capital, it also imposes recapture taxes on selling
firms to prevent tax-motivated sales. Auerbach and21 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
Kotlikoff (1983, 129–36) describe U.S. recapture 
taxes then in place.
20 Under the tax law, each owner of a sole proprietorship,
partnership, limited liability company, or small (S)
corporation pays individual income tax on his or her
share of the firm’s income. The front-loaded investment
incentives discussed in the text are used in computing
each owner’s tax liability. Each corporation (other than
an S corporation) pays a firm-level corporate income
tax on its taxable income, and (as discussed in the
text below) each of its shareholders also pays individ-
ual income tax on his or her dividends and capital
gains. The front-loaded investment incentives are used
to compute the corporate income tax but not the
shareholders’ individual income taxes. Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987, 131–35; 1983) discuss the effects of
front-loaded investment incentives on the value of 
capital. Lyon and Merrill (1999, 307), Diamond and
Zodrow (1999, 26), Gillis, Mieszkowski, and Zodrow
(1996, 748), Bradford (1996, 137), Auerbach (1996,
36), and Joint Committee on Taxation (1995, 84–85)
discuss the resulting implications for the transitional
effects of tax reform.
21 Nondeductible IRAs and tax-deferred annuities also
receive front-loaded incentives. Lewis and Seidman
(2000, 100), Gillis, Mieszkowski, and Zodrow (1996,
747), and Auerbach (1996, 38, 69) discuss the
transitional effects of front-loaded savings incentives.
22 Lewis and Seidman (2000, 100), Congressional
Budget Office (1997, 67), and Gillis, Mieszkowski, and
Zodrow (1996, 747) discuss the transitional implica-
tions of accrued capital gains.
23 The analysis in this section does not apply to invest-
ment by S corporations, noncorporate firms, or
consumers and governments.
24 Sinn (1991a; 1991b) thoroughly discusses the new
view. Congressional Budget Office (1997, 67), Gentry
and Hubbard (1997, 39), Gillis, Meiszkowski, and
Zodrow (1996, 748), and Auerbach (1996, 37, 69) note
its implications for the transitional effects of tax reform.
Koenig and Huffman (1998) assume the validity of the
new view in their analysis.
25 If new investments are imperfect substitutes for old
capital because they incorporate different technolo-
gies, the decline in value of existing capital is also 
mitigated. In the standard example, when tax reform
reduces the marginal product of new capital from 
0.13 to 0.12, I assume the marginal product of existing
capital falls by the same amount, which (along with 
the increase in its tax payments) causes its value to
decline. However, if the two vintages of capital are not
perfect substitutes, the expansion of new investment
may not drive down the return on existing capital to
the same extent.
26 Bradford (2000, 104–5; 1996, 138), Huffman and
Koenig (1998, 27–29), Lyon and Merrill (1999, 307–09),
Diamond and Zodrow (1999, 26), Gentry and Hubbard
(1997, 41), Congressional Budget Office (1997, 67),
and Auerbach (1996, 48, 61–63) discuss the implica-
tions of adjustment costs for the transitional effects of
tax reform.
27 Bradford (2000, 105, 107; 1996, 138, 140), Hall (1997,
149–50), Gentry and Hubbard (1997, 12, 43), and
Joint Committee on Taxation (1995, 85) discuss the
effects of tax reform on lightly taxed capital.
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